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CONSTITUTIONS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
NEW MARSY’S LAW FOR FLORIDA
PAUL G. CASSELL & MARGARET GARVIN*
A majority of states have adopted state constitutional amendments
protecting crime victims’ rights. Most of those amendments were adopted
long ago and many fail to comprehensively address crime victims’ interests.
In response to these shortcomings, the nation is seeing a new wave of state
constitutional amendments protecting crime victims’ rights. Among these
states is Florida, where in November 2018 Florida voters approved
significantly expanded protections for crime victims in Florida’s
Constitution—“Marsy’s Law for Florida.”
This Article explains in detail how Marsy’s Law for Florida provides
important new protections for crime victims in the Florida criminal justice
process. The Article begins by providing a brief overview of the crime
victims’ rights movement in this country. It then turns to the specific crime
victims’ rights added by the new Florida Amendment, describing why each
of these rights is an important addition to Florida’s Constitution (and other
similar constitutional amendments in other states). The Article concludes by
reviewing broader lessons to be learned from Florida’s new enactment,
contending that Florida’s recent experience may be useful for other states
considering expanding their state constitutional protections and may
ultimately set the stage for a federal constitutional debate about protecting
crime victims’ rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Most states now recognize that crime victims have compelling interests
at stake in criminal justice proceedings—interests so significant that they are
protected in state constitutional amendments. But many of those state
victims’ rights amendments were adopted more than three decades ago and,
in some respects, are beginning to show their age.1 Many of these
amendments contain only a short list of victims’ rights and lack effective
enforcement mechanisms.2 As a result of these defects, most amendments

1

See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted
Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135 (2007) (arguing that existing victims’ rights
provisions that lack victim standing, remedy, and review are flawed and calling for a third
wave of victims’ rights).
2
Arizona is a notable standout. Passed in 1990, the Arizona victims’ rights amendment,
together with its statutory implementation, has resulted in robust enforcement of victims’
rights. See AZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.

2020] PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 101
fall short of their goal of ensuring that victims’ interests are adequately
protected throughout the criminal justice system.
To address these concerns, a new wave of victims’ rights amendments
has been enacted over roughly the last decade, expanding the rights promised
to victims and ensuring that those rights can be enforced, even by the victims.
These new amendments draw on lessons learned over the last several decades
regarding the scope, structure, and articulation of rights necessary to make
crime victims’ rights meaningful. Oregon modified its constitution in 2008
to remove express hurdles to rights enforcement.3 That same year, California
adopted the first Marsy’s Law. Since then, similar Marsy’s Law amendments
were added to the state constitutions of Illinois in 2014,4 North Dakota and
South Dakota in 2016,5 Ohio in 2017,6 and Florida, Georgia, Nevada, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma in November 2018.7
While these amendments have significant import for criminal cases,
they have largely escaped serious scholarly attention. In this Article, we
attempt to shed light on how these new amendments operate, focusing
specifically on the recently adopted amendment in our nation’s third most
populous state, Florida. Florida approved one of the nation’s first victims’
rights amendments in 1988.8 Drawing on what has been learned in the three
decades since then, new provisions—known as “Marsy’s Law for Florida”—
were drafted by Florida’s Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC) in
early 2018 and approved by Florida’s voters in November 2018.9
This Article provides one of the first academic assessments of a Marsy’s
Law amendment, using Marsy’s Law for Florida as the springboard for
discussion. Our analysis proceeds in several steps. Part I describes the
history of crime victims’ rights, tracing victims’ involvement in the criminal
justice process from the earliest days of the nation through today. Of
particular importance are recent steps over the last several decades to add
victim participatory rights into state constitutions. Florida has been in the
3

OR CONST. art I, §§ 42, 43.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1.
5
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
6
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10(a).
7
FLA CONST. art I, § 16(b); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XXX; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 37; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34. An iteration of Marsy’s Law was adopted by
Montana in 2016, but was held to violate the state constitutional separate-vote requirement.
Montana Ass’n of Cnts. v. State, 404 P.3d 733, 748 (Mont. 2017). Similarly, Kentucky voters
approved a Marsy’s Law in 2018, but the vote was later held to be invalid because the entire
text of the amendment was not on the ballot. Westerfield v. Ward, No. 2018-SC-000583-TG,
2019 WL 2463046, at *10 (Ky. June 13, 2019).
8
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988).
9
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 2018).
4
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vanguard of that effort, with both its original amendment and recent
revisions.
Part II then turns to specific rights found in the new Florida provisions.
Florida now has constitutional protections not only for victims’ rights to
notice of court hearings, to be present at those hearings, and to be heard, but
also to a range of other protections such as preventing unreasonable delay in
the process and providing reasonable protection from defendants, as well
protection of victims’ privacy and dignity and a right to due process. Florida
also added important new enforcement mechanisms for its victims’ rights
amendment and language to make it entirely self-executing. These additions
draw upon a core set of values that have emerged around the country.
Part III concludes by examining some of the lessons from Florida’s new
and strengthened state constitutional amendment. Four lessons are evident.
First, victims’ rights can be constitutionally protected without harming the
criminal justice process or violating defendants’ rights. Second, a consensus
is emerging around the country regarding the kind of rights to which crime
victims are entitled. Third, victims should have “standing” to assert and seek
enforcement of the rights that they are promised. Finally, Florida’s broad
protections for such things as a victim’s right to “due process” could serve to
significantly expand the protections crime victims’ interests receive
throughout the criminal justice process and, more broadly, to invigorate a
constitutional dialogue in this country about protecting crime victims’ rights
in the federal constitution.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT
To understand state crime victims’ rights amendments in general—and
Florida’s new amendment in particular—it is useful to first understand some
history about the crime victims’ rights movement and state constitutional
protections for victims. This section briefly describes how state amendments
came to be enacted in many states and then turns specifically to Florida’s
new amendment.
A. RECOGNIZING CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

While a comprehensive history of crime victims’ rights in the criminal
justice process remains to be written, the broad outlines can be quickly
sketched. At our country’s founding, crime victims played an important role

2020] PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 103
in criminal prosecutions, often bringing their own “private” prosecutions.10
Over time, for reasons not fully understood, a system of public prosecution
steadily displaced the victims’ former role.11 Public prosecutors gradually
assumed full control over prosecution decisions and any separate interest of
victims came to lack legal weight. Ultimately, well into the twentieth
century, the system evolved to the point where the victim was “the forgotten
[person] of the system.”12
The Crime Victims’ Rights Movement developed in the 1970s in
response to this displacement of victims. The victim’s absence from criminal
processes conflicted with “a public sense of justice keen enough that it []
found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ movement.”13 Victims’
advocates—who hailed from diverse movements, including those concerned
with women’s rights, civil rights, and “law and order”—urged the adoption
of reforms giving more attention to victims’ concerns, including protecting
victims’ rights to be notified of court hearings, to attend those hearings, and
to be heard at appropriate points in the process.14 Similar developments also
occurred internationally.15
10
See, e.g., William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal
Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976) (describing colonial
American landscape in which individual victims themselves primarily conducted key roles in
the administration of justice including arrest, investigation, filing of charges, and prosecution).
11
See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2015); Beloof, supra
note 1, at 1138–42; Abraham Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal
Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 1 (1982).
12
McDonald, supra note 10, at 650.
13
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal
quotations omitted). See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 3–44 (4th ed. 2018); Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process:
The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1999); Collene Campbell et al.,
Statement from the Author, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 379 (2012); Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the
Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH
L. REV. 1373 (1994) [hereinafter Cassell, Balancing the Scales]; Goldstein, supra note 11;
William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative
Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996).
14
See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985
UTAH L. REV. 517, 543–47 (1985). See generally BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 31–36;
Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005
BYU L. REV. 255 (2005); Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 13, at 1380–82.
15
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIXED RESULTS: U.S. POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS ON THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF VICTIMS OF CRIME 3–8 (2008), https://www.
hrw.org/report/2008/09/23/mixed-results/us-policy-and-international-standards-rights-and-in
terests-victims [https://perma.cc/8HFD-A8FY] (discussing the many “international human
rights instruments [that] address or touch on [crime] victims’ rights”); cf. Michael K. Browne,
International Victims’ Rights Law What Can Be Gleaned from the Victims’ Empowerment
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The victims’ rights movement received considerable impetus in 1982
when the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime reviewed the treatment
of victims.16 In a report issued that year, the task force concluded that the
criminal justice system “has lost an essential balance. . . . [T]he system has
deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its protection. . . . The
victims of crime have been transformed into a group oppressively burdened
by a system designed to protect them. This oppression must be redressed.”17
The Task Force advocated multiple reforms, such as putting the
responsibility on prosecutors to keep victims notified of all court proceedings
and bringing to the court’s attention the victim’s view on subjects like bail,
plea bargains, sentences and restitution.18 The Task Force also urged that
courts should receive victim-impact evidence at sentencing, order restitution,
and allow victims and their families to attend trials even if they would be
called as witnesses.19 In its most sweeping recommendation, the Task Force
proposed a federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims’ rights
“to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”20
Realizing the difficulty of achieving the consensus required to amend
the United States Constitution, advocates for crime victims’ rights turned
their efforts to state victims’ rights amendments. The enactment of these
state constitutional amendments began with California in 1982,21 followed
by Rhode Island’s in 1986.22 Florida’s amendment was one of the first in the
nation and was approved in the next election cycle in 1988.23 The Florida
provision adopted was extremely brief, simply providing that:
Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide
victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when

Procedures in Germany as the United States Prepares to Consider the Adoption of a “Victim’s
Rights Amendment” to its Constitution, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 15 (2004) (discussing German
victims’ law); Marie Manikis, Imagining the Future of Victims’ Rights in Canada: A
Comparative Perspective, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163 (2015) (examining the evolution of
Canadian victims’ rights laws).
16
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE], https://www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/welcome.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/ZD25-CU9U].
17
Id. at 114.
18
Id. at 63.
19
Id. at 72–73.
20
Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted).
21
CA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
22
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23.
23
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988).
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relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.24

In the ensuing two decades, victims’ rights advocates had considerable
success with this “states first” strategy, 25 with about thirty-five states
adopting victims’ rights amendments to their state constitutions, protecting a
wide range of victims’ rights.26 In addition to these state constitutional
amendments, all fifty states passed statutory victims’ rights.27
B. FLORIDA’S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CRIME
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS

How well did the “first wave” of state constitutional enactments succeed
in securing the legal protection of victims’ interests in criminal justice? While
the amendments helped increase recognition of victims in criminal justice
processes, their effects fell short of full protection for victims’ independent
interests. Many of the amendments (such as Florida’s) contained only a short
list of victims’ rights.28 Many amendments also lacked effective enforcement
mechanisms to ensure that victims’ rights were fully implemented.29
Victims’ rights advocates have been concerned that such enactments
“frequently fail to provide meaningful protection whenever they come into
conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, [or] sheer inertia.”30
As the U.S. Justice Department reported in 1997:
[E]fforts to secure victims’ rights . . . have proved less than fully adequate. Victims[’]
rights advocates have sought reforms at the State level for the past 20 years and many
States have responded with State statutes and constitutional provisions that seek to
guarantee victims’ rights. However, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard victims’
rights. These significant State efforts simply are not sufficiently consistent,
comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard victims’ rights.31

24

Id.
See S. REP. NO. 108–191, at 3 (2003).
26
See Paul G. Cassell, Introduction: The Maturing Victims’ Rights Movement, 13 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2015).
27
See Beloof, supra note 14, at 257–58.
28
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16A; FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 16(b); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; WA. CONST. art. I, § 35.
29
See, e.g., Beloof, supra note 14, at 256–60, 300–23 (discussing state amendments
without clear and specific enforcement provisions).
30
Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution,
L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5.
31
A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 6 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno,
U.S. Att’y Gen.).
25
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While more recent assessments are infrequent, they generally conclude
that victims’ rights “enforcement is wildly uneven.”32
The failure to consistently enforce state victims’ rights has similarly
held true for federal victims’ rights. Consider, for example, one of the
seemingly simplest rights to provide: the right to notice of court hearings. In
the federal system, despite the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) extending
to crime victims a specific right to notice33 (and the availability of significant
federal resources to implement that right), many federal crime victims
continue to be unaware of their rights. A 2008 General Accounting Office
report found that approximately 25% of the responding federal crime victims
were unaware of their right to notice of court hearings.34 Even higher
percentages of uninformed victims were found in a survey of state criminal
justice systems.35 Compounding the problem, the same survey of state
victims found that racial minorities were less likely to be notified than their
white counterparts.36
In 2017, Jay Howell, a prominent Florida victims’ attorney with
significant experience representing victims throughout the state, testified
before the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission about these
difficulties in enforcing victims’ rights in Florida:
The issue is enforcement. Under our current system, with our broadly stated
constitutional amendment and our statutes, are victims seeing those rights unfold in
their cases? And, the sad reality is that they are not. We don’t have, despite almost
thirty years under our constitutional amendment and our statutes, a comprehensive,
consistent or authoritative system for enforcing the rights in practice . . . .37

One way of improving enforcement of state crime victims’ rights
enactments is by strengthening state constitutional protections. A second
wave of state constitutional efforts began in 2008. Oregon adopted
amendments to Article 1, Sections 42 and 43 to enhance enforceability and
32

BIBAS, supra note 11, at 90.
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (2019).
34
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-54, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT:
INCREASING AWARENESS, MODIFYING THE COMPLAINT PROCESS, AND ENHANCING
COMPLIANCE MONITORING WILL IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT 82 (2008).
35
National Victim Center, Comparison of White and Non-White Crime Victim Responses
Regarding Victims’ Rights, in VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 701–03 (4th
ed. 2018).
36
Id. at 703.
37
Constitution Revision Commission Declaration of Rights Committee, December 12,
2017 (statement of Jay Howell, made at 1:14:00), https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/12-1217-constitution-revision-commission-declaration-rights-committee/. [https://perma.cc/F7P3AGMW]
33
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California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9—Marsy’s Law,
for California.38 Since then, similar Marsy’s Law amendments were added to
the state constitutions of Illinois in 2014,39 North Dakota40 and South Dakota
in 2016,41 Ohio in 2017,42 and (along with Florida) Georgia,43 Nevada,44
North Carolina,45 and Oklahoma46 in November 2018.
The provisions in the recently enacted victims’ rights amendments are
more comprehensive than the Florida provision adopted nearly thirty years
ago. Typically, these newer amendments contain fifteen or more specific
rights for crime victims, along with detailed provisions concerning the
enforcement of rights and a definition of the “victims” who can avail
themselves of the rights.47 The combination of a robust set of rights and
explicit standing and enforcement provisions is the common thread in this
new wave of state-constitutional amendments known as “Marsy’s Laws.”
The recently adopted Marsy’s Law for Florida follows the path of these
other recent state-level constitutional amendments. Florida’s constitution is
one of the most amendable in the country,48 and the amendment moved
through Florida’s unique mechanism for evaluating changes to the Florida
Constitution: the Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC).49 Florida’s
CRC dates to 1968, when Florida’s voters ratified three separate
constitutional amendments—including one requiring a Constitutional
Revision Commission to convene and examine the Florida Constitution once

38
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. The namesake for the California enactment is Marsy Nicholas,
who was the sister of Dr. Henry Nicholas, the co-founder of Broadcom Corporation. In 1983,
Marsy was stalked and murdered in California by her ex-boyfriend. Marsy’s Law, in its
California iteration and elsewhere, attempts to prevent recurrence of the poor treatment the
Nicholas family received during the criminal justice process by affording to victims a robust
set of rights, as well as explicit mechanisms to assert and seek enforcement of those rights.
39
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1.
40
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25.
41
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
42
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10(a).
43
GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ XXX.
44
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8.
45
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37.
46
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34.
47
See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 2; 25S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
48
TALBOT D’ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 11–
13 (1991).
49
See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth
Its Popular Sovereignty Price, 52 FLA. L. REV. 249 (2000) (describing the Constitution
Revision Commission’s suggested changes to the Florida Constitution).
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every twenty years, beginning in 1977.50 A CRC met in 1977–78, 1997–98,
and, most recently, 2017–18.51
On November 7, 2017, five members of the CRC filed the Marsy’s Law
for Florida proposal.52 On January 19, 2018, following a hearing before the
Declaration of Rights Subcommittee, the proposal was approved by a 6-1
vote.53 The CRC held further hearings on the proposal around the State and,
on April 18, 2018, the full CRC approved the proposal and sent it to the voters
for their consideration.54
On November 6, 2018, the necessary supermajority of Florida voters
approved the amendment, with 61.6% of Florida voters voting to pass the
measure.55
II. SPECIFIC RIGHTS IN FLORIDA’S NEW VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Crime victims in Florida now have a more comprehensive and
enforceable set of state constitutional rights.56 But some critics of these new
state constitutional protections have raised concerns, suggesting (often
without any specific support) that protections for criminal defendants will be
eroded or other unintended problems may emerge.57 Other critics take the
opposite tack, arguing that these measures are mere “feel good” gestures that
will make no substantive difference for crime victims.58
We believe both of these objections are misplaced. In this part of this
Article, we respond to these concerns, using Florida’s language as a
springboard. Careful analysis of Florida’s new provisions, as well as parallel
50

See CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 2017-2018, HISTORY (2018), https://flcrc.
gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/ESZ6-FHSW] (archived website that describes the history
of Florida’s Constitutional Review Commission).
51
Id.
52
See CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 2017-2018, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS:
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AND OF VICTIMS; ADDITIONAL RIGHTS OF VICTIMS (2018), https://flcrc.
gov/Proposals/Commissioner/2017/0096 [https://perma.cc/4JTZ-SYJQ].
53
Id.
54
Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n Meeting, April 16, 2018 Session, vol. I, at
131 (Apr. 16, 2018) https://crc.law.fsu.edu/publishedcontent/administrativepublications/meet
ings/transcripts/transcript04-16-2018vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW32-BV66].
55
See Florida Division of Elections, Rights of Crime Victims, (Nov. 6, 2018), https://flori
daelectionwatch.gov/Amendments [https://perma.cc/HX2R-8TY7] (maintained by the Fla.
Dep’t of State).
56
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1)(a).
57
See, e.g., Andrew Pantazi, Will Marsy’s Law Help Victims or Create New Problems?,
JACKSONVILLE FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 28, 2018, https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20180
928/will-marsys-law-help-victims-or-create-new-problems [https://perma.cc/A2RR-F3TS].
58
Id.
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language found in other state constitutions, shows that victims’ rights do not
harm the administration of criminal justice or violate defendants’ rights. In
the sections that follow, we trace the source of Florida’s extensive list of
victims’ rights. We describe and analyze the most significant rights provided
in the new Florida Amendment, explaining how each of these rights would
operate against the backdrop of other similar provisions that exist around the
country.59 We also look at provisions defining who is a crime “victim”
entitled to rights as well as the enforcement mechanisms available to victims
to assert their rights. This review demonstrates that the new Florida
Amendment is a measure that properly draws on an emerging consensus
around the country on how state constitutional victims’ rights amendments
should be drafted.
A. THE RIGHT TO NOTICE OF CASE PROCEEDINGS

A crime victim’s right to notice of criminal proceedings is an important
right that is now broadly recognized. Because victims and their families are
directly and often irreparably harmed by crime, they have a vital interest in
knowing about any subsequent prosecution and any associated proceedings.
Notice of proceedings is traditionally recognized as a core part of due
process.60 Knowing what is happening cannot only greatly reduce a victim’s
anxiety about the process,61 but it can allow them to take necessary safety
measures and prepare for subsequent aspects of the case when they may have
more participatory rights at stake. For these reasons, the President’s Task
Force on Victims of Crime urged that “[p]rosecutors should keep victims
informed about the status of the case from the initial decision to charge or to
decline prosecution.”62
Building on this recommendation, the Marsy’s Law for Florida
Amendment provides that a victim will receive notice of case proceedings.
Specifically, the proposal extends to victims, “upon request,” the right to
“reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of . . . all public proceedings
involving the criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, trial, plea,
sentencing, or adjudication . . . .”63 This provision is similar to those found
in many other states’ constitutional and statutory provisions, which promise
59
In this brief article, we do not discuss every right that might be considered fundamental
or important to victims.
60
See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002).
61
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 64 (quoting victim to this effect).
62
Id.
63
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(a). The new amendment extends to victims a specific right
to “due process,” as discussed infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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crime victims that they will be notified about criminal justice events related
to the crimes committed against them.64 The California Constitution, for
example, guarantees crime victims “reasonable notice” of all public
proceedings.65 And the Texas Constitution promises “the right to notification
of court proceedings” on the “request of a crime victim.”66
The new notice provision in the Florida Amendment mirrors these
constitutional rights in other states and extends an unqualified right to
“reasonable notice” of all public court proceedings to Florida’s crime
victims. The provision expands on the earlier version, which provided a right
to notice only for “all crucial stages of criminal proceedings,”67 a phrase that
was not precisely defined and in its ambiguity did not provide clear
protections for victims. The new Florida notice provision provides
constitutional foundation for victim notification, ensuring that the existing
state statutory scheme directing state agencies to provide “guidelines” for
notification cannot undercut the notification to victims.68
Fortunately, with emerging electronic technologies, keeping victims
informed about court hearings is becoming easier.69 Automated victimnotification systems abound; most prominently used in many states is the socalled VINE (Victim Information Notification Everyday) system.70 Under
such a system, a victim registers for notification through e-mail or phone call.
Then, when court hearings are scheduled, a computerized notification is
made.
In some cases (for example, terrorist bombings or massive financial
fraud), the large number of victims may render individual notifications
impractical. In such circumstances, notice by means of a press release to

64
Notice and other rights provisions across the country vary with regard to inclusion of
the “upon request” language. Notably, even when a right includes opt-in language such as
“upon request” there are system obligations to ensure the right has meaning. See, e.g., Ariz.
ex rel. Hance v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 875 P.2d 824, 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
(determining in the context of parole that the state may not use a victim’s failure to request
notice as an excuse for denying rights when the state failed to use reasonable efforts to inform
the victim she was constitutional entitled to request notice).
65
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(7).
66
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(2)(b)(1).
67
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (1988).
68
See FLA. STAT. § 960.001 (providing “guidelines” for fair treatment of victims and
witnesses in the criminal justice and juvenile justice systems).
69
See BIBAS, supra note 11, at 150 (“With the advent of email, notifying victims . . . is
even easier.”).
70
See, e.g., VINE, APPRISS SAFETY (2020), https://apprisssafety.com/solutions/vine/
[https://perma.cc/9HAK-RLBE].
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daily newspapers in the area has been regarded as a reasonable alternative to
actual notice sent to each victim at his/her/their residential address.71 New
technologies may also provide a way of affording reasonable notice, with
more direct notification. For example, some federal courts have approved
notice by publication, where the publication directs crime victims to a
website maintained by the government with hyperlinks to updates on cases.72
The Florida notice provision comfortably embraces such possibilities by
requiring that victims receive “reasonable” notice of court proceedings.
B. THE RIGHT TO ATTEND COURT HEARINGS

The new Florida Amendment also guarantees crime victims, “upon
request,” an unqualified right “to be present at all public proceedings
involving the criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, trial, plea,
sentencing, or adjudication, even if the victim will be a witness at the
proceeding, notwithstanding any rule to the contrary.”73 This right builds on
a reascendant national consensus that victims deserve the right to attend all
proceedings related to their case.74
In 1982, the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime articulated the
rationale and need for a right to attend criminal trials:
The crime is often one of the most significant events in the lives of victims and their
families. They, no less than the defendant, have a legitimate interest in the fair
adjudication of the case, and should therefore, as an exception to the general rule
providing for the exclusion of witnesses, be permitted to be present for the entire trial.75

Several strong reasons support such a right. As Professor Doug Beloof
and one of this Article’s authors have argued at length,76 the right to attend
the trial may be critical in allowing the victim to recover from the
psychological damage of a crime. It is widely recognized that the “victim’s

71
United States v. Peralta, No. 3:08-cr-233, 2009 WL 2998050, at *1–2 (W.D.N.C. Sept.
15, 2009).
72
See, e.g., United States v. Skilling, No. H-04-025-SS, 2009 WL 806757, at *1–2 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 26, 2009); United States v. Saltsman, No. 07-CR-641 (NGG), 2007 WL 4232985,
at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); United States v. Croteau, No. 05-CR-30104-DRH, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23684, at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2006).
73
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(7)(a).
74
See Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim’s Right to Attend the Trial:
The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 504–14 (2005).
75
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 80.
76
See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74.
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presence during the trial may also facilitate healing of the debilitating
psychological wounds suffered by a crime victim.”77
Moreover, without a right to attend the trial, “the criminal justice system
merely intensifies the loss of control that victims feel after the crime.” 78 It
should come as no surprise that “[v]ictims are often appalled to learn that
they may not be allowed to sit in the courtroom during hearings or the trial.
They are unable to understand why they cannot simply observe the
proceedings in a supposedly public forum.”79 One crime victim put it more
directly: “All we ask is that we be treated just like a criminal.”80 Defendants
take full advantage of their right to be in the courtroom.81
To ensure that victims can attend court proceedings, many state
amendments extend to a crime victim an unqualified right to attend the trial,82
while others extend only a qualified right to attend, limiting the right if the
victim’s testimony would be materially affected by attendance.83 The 1988
Florida Victims’ Right Amendment only extended to Florida victims a
qualified right to attend court hearings—specifically, a right to be present “to
the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of
the accused.”84 This qualifying phrase is ambiguous, because it is unclear
77

Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crime/Victims of Justice, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 41 (1987).
Deborah P. Kelly, Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 69, 72 (1987).
79
Marlene A. Young, A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victims’
Perspective, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 51, 58 (1987).
80
Id. at 59 (quoting Edmund Newton, Criminals Have All the Rights, LADIES’ HOME J.,
Sept. 1986).
81
See LINDA E. LEDRAY, RECOVERING FROM RAPE 199 (2d ed. 1994) (“Even the most
disheveled [rapist] will turn up in court clean-shaven, with a haircut, and often wearing a suit
and tie. He will not appear to be the type of man who could rape.”).
82
See, e.g., AK. CONST. art. I, § 24 (right “to be present at all criminal . . . proceedings
where the accused has the right to be present”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (right “to attend
the trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to attend”); OR. R. EVID. 615
(witness exclusion rule does not apply to “victim in a criminal case”); see also Beloof &
Cassell, supra note 74, at 504–19 (providing a comprehensive discussion of state law on this
subject).
83
See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (victim has “the right to be present at trial unless
the trial court finds sequestration necessary for a fair trial for the defendant”).
84
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988) (“Victims of crime or their lawful
representatives . . . are entitled to the right . . . to be present . . . at all crucial stages of criminal
proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the
accused”); see also FLA. STAT. § 960.001(1)(e) (“A victim, a victim’s parent or guardian if the
victim is a minor, a lawful representative of the victim or of the victim’s parent or guardian if
the victim is a minor, or a victim’s next of kin may not be excluded from any portion of any
hearing, trial, or proceeding pertaining to the offense based solely on the fact that such person
is subpoenaed to testify, unless, upon motion, the court determines such person’s presence to
78
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how a victim attending a trial could interfere with the rights of the accused.85
A related implementing statute was similarly unhelpful. It provided that “[i]n
a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the victim’s next of kin, the parent
or guardian of a minor child victim, or a lawful representative of such person”
cannot be sequestered from a trial “unless, upon motion, the court determines
such person’s presence to be prejudicial.”86 Here again, what is “prejudicial”
is left undefined.
The new Florida Amendment resolves such ambiguities by clearly
establishing an unqualified right for a victim to attend a trial—even where
the victim might be called as a witness. Such a provision is constitutional,
as the relevant case law demonstrates. While the United States Supreme
Court has not spoken at any length on witness sequestration rules,87 many
lower courts have. For example, the Eleventh Circuit—the federal Court of
Appeals with jurisdiction over Florida—found no violation of a defendant’s
constitutional rights when a murdered police officer’s young son attended a
capital sentencing proceeding.88 The Court could
see no error, much less a constitutional deprivation, in the trial court’s ruling. Petitioner
cites no authority for the proposition that due process requires that in a capital
sentencing proceeding, the defendant has a constitutional right to have removed from
the courtroom spectators whose presence may remind the jury of the victim. A criminal
proceeding is a public hearing; all citizens, including the victim’s family, have a right
to attend.89

be prejudicial.”); FLA. STAT. § 90.616(2)(d) (“A witness may not be excluded if the witness
is . . . [i]n a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the victim’s next of kin, the parent or
guardian of a minor child victim, or a lawful representative of such person, unless, upon
motion, the court determines such person’s presence to be prejudicial.”).
85
See generally Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74, at 527–34 (collecting case law on this
issue).
86
FLA. STAT. § 90.616.
87
The Supreme Court has indicated that exclusion of a witness who disobeys a
sequestration order is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, Holder v. United
States, 150 U.S. 91, 92 (1893), a ruling that hardly suggests constitutional underpinnings for
sequestration. The Supreme Court has also held that a defendant cannot be sequestered
because of his right to confront witnesses against him, Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282
(1989), and that sequestration does not permit a trial judge to prevent a defendant from
communicating with his lawyer during an overnight break. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80, 88 (1976).
88
Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1523 (11th Cir. 1988).
89
Id. at 1523; see also United States v. Edwards, 526 F.3d 747, 758 (11th Cir. 2008)
(finding that “[a] criminal defendant has no constitutional right to exclude witnesses from the
courtroom”); State v. Williams, 960 A.2d 805, 815 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (finding
that “defendant had no constitutional right to exclude [victim] from the courtroom while
[victim] had a constitutional right to remain after concluding his testimony”).
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Other courts have explained that the issue of witness sequestration
simply presents no federal constitutional question. The reasons were wellstated by Judge Posner, who explained that the Constitution does not embody
every procedural device that might protect a defendant: “A refusal to
exclude . . . witnesses until they testify is not a denial of due process . . . .
[T]he due process clause does not incorporate every refinement of legal
procedure designed to make trials fairer or more accurate—not even one
hallowed by time.”90 Following this same analysis, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has rejected a constitutional attack on Maryland’s victims’
attendance provision, holding:
Nothing in the constitution touches on the exclusion of witnesses during criminal trials.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 10 of
our own guarantee to an accused a speedy and public trial and to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. Otherwise neither document contains anything that might be
seen as a right to limit those who may want to attend the trial.91

Based on such well-developed case law,92 the unqualified right to attend
the entire trial that Florida’s amendment provides victims is constitutional.93
And Florida’s victims are now unequivocally guaranteed the ability to attend
all other public proceedings involving the crimes committed against them.
C. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD AT RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS

In addition to creating an unqualified right for victims to attend an
offender’s trial, Florida’s new amendment also grants victims the right to be
heard at various points throughout the criminal justice process. Specifically,
the amendment enumerates victims’ right to be heard, “upon request,” in
“public proceeding[s] involving pretrial or other release from any form of
legal constraint, plea, sentencing, adjudication, or parole” and, more

90

Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169, 170 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also State
v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a victim’s right to attend
and remain in the courtroom during the entire trial of a defendant did not facially, or as applied,
violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial).
91
Wheeler v. State, 596 A.2d 78, 88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
92
See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74, at 527–29 (collecting cases rejecting defendant’s
arguments that victim/witness exclusion is constitutionally required).
93
Martinez v. State, 664 So.2d 1034, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), suggested, in what
seems to have been dicta, that a defendant had some sort of right to exclude a victim from
opening statements in trial. In light of the authorities collected above, none of which appear
to have been considered by Martinez, the dicta in the case should not be regarded as
persuasive. See also Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74, at 533–34 (arguing Martinez is
“singularly unpersuasive”).
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generally, in “any proceeding during which a right of the victim is
implicated.”94
This new version of the right to be heard expands the former right-tobe-heard provision. The previous version limited the right to be heard to
unspecified “crucial stages” of criminal cases.95 In contrast, Florida’s new,
expanded right-to-be-heard provision specifically enumerates various stages
of a criminal proceeding where a victim is guaranteed the right to be heard,
and adds a final catch-all for any other proceeding where a victim’s right
might be implicated.
This expansion follows the trend in many other states. Many states now
recognize that crime victims deserve the right to be heard at numerous points
in the criminal justice process, thus allowing victims to participate directly
in the administration of criminal justice.96 Direct victim participation can
provide important information to judges. For example, allowing an
individual victim to speak at sentencing is useful because “gauging the harm
to a unique human being, not a faceless abstraction, requires evidence of how
that particular victim suffered.”97 Victim participation can also lead to
important therapeutic benefits for victims and legitimizing benefits for the
system. As then-Professor (now-Judge) Stephanos Bibas has explained at
length in The Machinery of Criminal Justice, “it is simple participation that
helps to empower and heal victims. Participants see the law as more fair and
more legitimate when they have some control over the process and [] they
have been heard, whether or not they control ultimate outcomes.”98
Recognizing such benefits, many states have extended a right to victims
to participate directly in some criminal justice proceedings. For example, the
recently enacted constitutional provision in South Dakota promises crime
victims “[t]he right to be heard in any proceeding involving release, plea,
sentencing, adjudication, disposition or parole, and any proceeding during
which a right of the victim is implicated.”99 Other states have similar

94

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b).
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988).
96
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(b)(8) (providing victims the right “[t]o be heard, upon
request, at any proceeding, including any delinquency proceeding, involving a post-arrest
release decision, plea, sentencing, post-conviction release decision, or any proceeding in
which a right of the victim is at issue”).
97
BIBAS, supra note 11, at 91; see also Laurence H. Tribe, McVeigh’s Victims Had a Right
to Speak, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1997, at A25.
98
BIBAS, supra note 11, at 151.
99
S.D. CONST. art VI, § 29.
95
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provisions in their state constitutions guaranteeing victims the opportunity to
participate.100
Like other states, the Florida Amendment identifies specific stages at
which a victim has the right to be heard. The first is the right to be heard “in
any public proceeding involving pretrial or other release from any form of
legal constraint . . . .”101 This broad provision covers any decision to release
a defendant on bail or other form of pre-trial release.102 This right ensures
that a victim can address the court directly regarding whether a judge should
release a defendant before trial. The victim is not given the ability to
command or veto the release or detention of any defendant; the ultimate
decision remains with the judge. Similarly, when considering later release
such as parole, a victim statement “can enable the board to appreciate fully
the nature of the offense and the degree to which the particular inmate may
[present risks to the victim or community] upon release.”103 The board, of
course, makes the final parole decision.
The new Florida Amendment also extends to victims a right to be heard
regarding any “plea,”104 consistent with provisions in many other states.105 A
100
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 2.1(A)(4) (right to be heard at proceedings involving
post-arrest release, negotiated pleas, and sentencing); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (right to be
heard at critical stages); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(5) (right to make statement at sentencing);
KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15(a) (right to be heard at sentencing or any other appropriate time);
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (right to make statement at sentencing); MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 32(1)–(2) (right to be heard at guilty pleas, bail hearings, sentencings, probation revocation
hearings, and parole hearings, unless interests of justice require otherwise); N.M. CONST. art.
II, § 24(A)(7) (right to make statement at sentencing and post-sentencing hearings); R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (right to address court at sentencing); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(b) (right
to be heard at important proceedings); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (right to make statement at
sentencing or release proceeding); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (opportunity to make statement to
court at disposition).
101
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b).
102
See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(b) (setting out possible conditions of pre-trial release); FLA.
STAT. § 903.046(2) (setting out bail determination criteria); see also Byrd v. Mascara, 197
So.3d 1211, 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing circumstances in which bail might be
excessive). See generally SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018).
103
Frances P. Bernat et al., Victim Impact Laws and the Parole Process in the United
States: Balancing Victim and Inmate Rights and Interests, 3 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 121,
134 (1994). See generally Laura L. Richardson, The Impact of Marsy’s Law on Parole in
California, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 1091 (2013) (discussing changes in parole hearings after
Marsy’s law enactment); Kathryne M. Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’ Rights:
Implementation, Ambiguity, and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431 (2016) (discussing victim
participation in parole hearings).
104
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b).
105
See BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 419–21.
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victim’s right to be heard concerning a plea is important, because under
Florida’s current rules of procedure, the judge is not bound to approve a plea
agreement negotiated by the parties.106 This is consistent with the rule in
most states that a plea bargain between the prosecution and a defendant must
be submitted to the trial judge for approval.107 If the judge believes that the
bargain is not in the interests of justice, she may reject it.108 Unfortunately
in some states, a victim does not always have the opportunity to discuss a
plea with the prosecution while it is being negotiated109 or to present to the
judge information about whether the plea is in the interests of justice. Yet
there are compelling reasons to afford victims a role in the plea-bargaining
process:
The victim’s interests in participating in the plea bargaining process are many. The fact
that they are consulted and listened to provide them with respect and an
acknowledgment that they are the harmed individual. This in turn may contribute to the
psychological healing of the victim. The victim may have financial interests in the form
of restitution or compensatory fine. . . . [B]ecause judges act in the public interest when
they decide to accept or reject a plea bargain, the victim is an additional source of
information for the court.110

The Florida Amendment not only gives victims a right to be heard
before a judge agrees to accept any plea, but also gives victims, upon request,
a specific right to “confer with the prosecuting attorney concerning any plea
agreements . . . .”111 Similar rights are found in other state constitutions and

Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 1996) (the judge “is never bound to honor the
[plea] agreement”).
107
See id. at 419–22 (discussing this issue).
108
See, e.g., UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (“The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty . . . .”); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (following Rule 11(e) and
holding “[n]othing in the statute requires a court to accept a guilty plea . . . ”).
109
See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 377
(2016) (discussing diversity in practice about victim involvement in plea negotiations).
110
BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 423. See generally Elizabeth N. Jones, The Ascending
Role of Crime Victims in Plea-Bargaining and Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 97 (2014)
(discussing victims’ rights during plea); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims:
From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 330–32 (2007) (victim involvement
in plea bargains improves perception of fair treatment and increases public confidence in the
process); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U.L. REV. 301
(1987) (advancing reasons for victim participation in plea discussions).
111
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(c). The provision also extends rights to confer regarding
“release, restitution, sentencing, or any other disposition of the case.” Id. The principles
discussed above in text about conferring on plea decisions apply equally to these other
situations.
106
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the federal CVRA.112 A right to confer with the prosecutor gives a crime
victim the ability to potentially influence the prosecutor’s decision about
what kind of plea arrangement to offer. This means that the right to confer
must be provided “at a time that will enable the victims to exercise those
rights meaningfully.”113 As with the right to be heard regarding any release,
victims have a voice in the plea-bargaining process, not a veto or a mandate.
The judge is not required to follow the victim’s suggested course of action
regarding the plea, but gains more information on which to base a
determination on how best to proceed.
The new Florida Amendment also specifically gives victims a right to
be heard at “any public proceeding involving . . . sentencing, adjudication, or
parole . . . .”114 Here again, this provision is consistent with those of many
other state amendments, which typically extend to victims the right to be
heard at proceedings for determining a sentence115 or parole.116 Defendants,
of course, have the right to directly address the sentencing authority before a
sentence is imposed.117 The Florida provision extends the same basic right
to victims.118
The reasons for a victim’s right to be heard at sentencing are manifold,
including providing information to the sentencing judge, creating therapeutic
and other benefits for victims, explaining the crime’s harm to the defendant,
and improving the perceived fairness of sentencing.119 It is important to
112
See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. I, § 29(10) (giving victims the right “to confer with the
attorney for the government”); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (“the reasonable right to confer with
the attorney for the Government in the case”).
113
Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (explaining
important of victim conferral right) (citing United States v. BP Products North America, 2008
WL 501321 (S.D. Tex. 2008)); see also Opinion and Order, Jane Does v. United States, No.
9:08-cv-80736-KAM (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2019) (finding that victims of Jeffrey Epstein sex
trafficking crimes should have been informed before prosecutors entered into a nonprosecution agreement).
114
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1)(b).
115
See BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 599–600.
116
See id. at 645.
117
See, e.g., Hill v. State, 246 So.3d 392, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (discussing
defendant’s right of allocution); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A) (recognizing defendant’s
right to allocute in federal cases).
118
See generally NORMA DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES,
STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 349–58 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing victim impact statements). See
also Cozzie v. State, No. SC13-2393, 2017 WL 1954976, at *9 (Fla. May 11, 2017)
(recognizing that crime victims’ state constitutional right to be heard at crucial stages supports
the admission of victim impact evidence at sentencing).
119
See generally Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 611 (2009).
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emphasize that victims “are not reflexively punitive” and a number of
“[e]mpirical studies find that participation by victims does not lead to harsher
sentences.”120 Nor does the claim that victims’ impact statements might be
somehow “emotional” carry much weight, given that many other parts of the
law recognize the propriety of emotional arguments.121
Victims can exercise their right to be heard in any appropriate fashion,
including making an oral statement at court proceedings or submitting
written information for the court’s consideration.122 Defendants can likewise
respond to the information that victims provide in appropriate ways, such as

120
Bibas, supra note 11, at 91; see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VICTIM IMPACT
STATEMENTS: THEIR EFFECTS ON COURT OUTCOMES AND VICTIM SATISFACTION 68 (1990)
(concluding that the result of the study “lend[s] support to advocates of victim impact
statements” since no evidence indicates that these statements “put[] defendants in jeopardy
[or] result in harsher sentences”); EDWIN VILLMOARE & VIRGINIA N. NETO, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, VICTIM APPEARANCES AT SENTENCING
HEARINGS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA VICTIMS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 61 (1987) (“[t]he right to
allocution at sentencing has had little net effect . . . on sentences in general”); Cassell, supra
note 119, at 634–37 (“good evidence that victim impact statements generally lead to harsher
sentences is lacking”); Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, The Effects of Victim Impact
Statements on Sentencing Decisions: A Test in an Urban Setting, 11 JUST. Q. 453, 466 (1994)
(finding “no support for those who argue against [victim impact] statements on the grounds
that their use places defendants in jeopardy”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim
Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 306, 308 (2003) (“We find [no] significant relation between the introduction of [victim
impact evidence] and sentencing outcomes”); Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad
Victims? Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice,
1999 CRIM. L. REV. 545, 548 (1999) (“sentence severity has not increased following the
passage of [victim impact] legislation”); cf. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 137 (2004)
(“Victims do not want vengeance so much as additional rights to participate.”). But cf. Susan
A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161,
166–67 (2012) (arguing that mock jury research shows victim impact evidence leads to
punitiveness); Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The
Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003,
1050 (2014) (discussing limitations of the current studies and making suggestions for future
research).
121
Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 355, 356 (2008) (“Rather than bemoaning emotional reactions, reformers
should acknowledge emotion as the legitimate battlefield of criminal justice.”); cf. Paul G.
Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims Rights Amendment,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 486–96 (victim impact statements convey information, not emotion).
122
See Paul G. Cassell & Edna Erez, Victim Impact Statements and Ancillary Harm: The
American Perspective, 15 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 149, 163–67 (2011) (discussing victims’ rights
to present impact statements orally and in other ways).
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providing counter-information.123 To assist victims in making statements
that may be useful to the sentencing judge, the Florida Amendment gives
victims the “right to receive a copy of any presentence report, and any other
report or record relevant to the exercise of a victim’s right, except for such
portions made confidential or exempt by law.”124 This provision ensures that
Florida victims will know the salient facts that a judge is considering when
imposing a sentence, unlike the shot-in-the-dark approach that some other
jurisdictions follow by not providing victims access to the report.125
The Florida Amendment also extends a right to be heard to “any
proceeding during which a right of the victim is implicated.”126 This catchall is consistent with language in many other state amendments.127 This
makes explicit that victims can present information in support of a claim of
right under the amendments, consistent with ordinary due-process
principles.128
Indeed, fortifying the new right to be heard in Florida is based on
ensuring an overarching and general right to “due process.”129 This right has
the potential to be a sweeping protection for crime victims in Florida, just as
the federal Due Process Clause has provided significant protections for
criminal defendants in criminal justice proceedings throughout the country.
The exact reach of Florida’s new due process provision will depend on casespecific development in future years, but it should ensure that victims’
interests are broadly considered whenever judges and other actors make
procedural decisions affecting victims.
D. THE RIGHT TO PROCEEDINGS FREE FROM UNREASONABLE
DELAY

Florida’s amendment also guarantees victims the right “to proceedings
free from unreasonable delay, and to prompt and final conclusion of the case
123

See generally id. at 175–96 (providing a fifty-state survey on procedures concerning
victim impact statements).
124
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(e).
125
See Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, UTAH L. REV. 861, 928–936 (2007) (discussing
conflicting federal law on whether victims can receive access to the presentence report in
federal cases).
126
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b).
127
See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29(9).
128
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (“For more than a century the central
meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard.”) (internal quotation omitted).
129
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1).
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and any related postjudgment proceedings.”130 This provision parallels
language found in many other state provisions that have extended to crime
victims the right to “a speedy trial and a prompt and final conclusion of the
case”131 or to proceedings “free from unreasonable delay.”132 Such
provisions are designed to be the victim’s analogue to a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.133 The defendant’s right is designed,
among other things, “to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation” and “to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the
ability of an accused to defend himself.”134 The interests underlying a speedy
trial, however, are not confined to defendants. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the
accused.”135
Victims often suffer significantly from delays in the criminal justice
system.136 A “common problem in the prosecution of crimes against victims
is that the trial is typically delayed through scheduling conflicts,
continuances, and other unexpected delays throughout the course of the
trial.”137 And victims suffer as a consequence of these delays. For example,
victims of violent crime frequently suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD).138 A connection between initial victimization and later depression,
substance abuse, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, obsessive130

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(10).
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(10); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(9).
132
See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(6); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1); MO. CONST. art.
I, § 32(1)(5); WIS. CONST. art I, § 9m. The right may also exist in statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 960.001(1)(a)(7) (requiring law enforcement to inform victims of “[t]he right of a victim to
a prompt and timely disposition of the case in order to minimize the period during which the
victim must endure the responsibilities and stress involved to the extent that this right does not
interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused”).
133
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”).
134
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969) (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 120 (1966)).
135
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
136
See Brief of Arizona Voice for Crime Victims et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 6–9, Ryan v. Washington, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-840) (collecting
research on delays). This section draws on the research collected in the AVCV brief.
137
Mary Beth Ricke, Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, Improvements, and
Alternatives to Legislative Protection, 41 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 181, 183 (2013).
138
See Dean G. Kilpatrick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims:
Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 119, 125–26 (2003); Jim Parsons &
Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 182 (2010).
131
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compulsive disorder, and even suicide have also been reported in the
academic literature.139 Delays in the criminal process can exacerbate these
initial injuries. Multiple studies suggest “the negative effect on a victim’s
healing process when there is a prolonged trial of the alleged attacker because
the actual judicial process is a burden on the victim.”140 And “[t]he long
delay between reporting a crime to the police and the beginning of the trial
represents [a] source of psychological stress for crime victims.”141
Academic literature confirms the ways in which delays in the criminal
justice system can compound the crime’s initial harmful effects on a
victim.142 A victim’s experience with the justice system often “means the
difference between a healing experience and one that exacerbates the initial
trauma.”143 Delays in proceedings can also be particularly difficult for child
victims, who may have difficulty healing until the anxiety of legal
proceedings can be brought to an end.144
The new Florida provisions do not require a judge to follow a victim’s
call for scheduling trial or for ending all delay; rather, a judge must prevent
“unreasonable” delay”145 and, ultimately, provide a victim with “a prompt
and final conclusion of the case.”146 Because of language and intent
similarities, when interpreting these provisions, Florida courts can look to the
traditional body of case law that already exists for resolving defendants’
speedy-trial claims.147

Parsons & Bergin, supra note 138, at 182.
Ricke, supra note 137, at 193.
141
Ulrich Orth & Andreas Maercker, Do Trials of Perpetrators Retraumatize Victims?, 19
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 212, 215 (2004).
142
Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal
Intervention, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 159, 159 (2003).
143
Parsons & Bergin, supra note 138, at 182; see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573,
585 (2006) (“Both the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely
enforcement of a sentence.”); Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel Gold in a Hill of Beans,
2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 311, 322 (2006).
144
Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 13, at 1402–07.
145
See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 931 (D. Utah 2005)
(interpreting CVRA’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay to preclude delay in
sentencing).
146
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(10).
147
For example, in Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court set forth various
factors that could be used to evaluate a defendant’s speedy-trial challenge in the wake of a
delay. 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972) (describing factors such as: (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether and when the defendant asserted his speedy-trial right;
and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2 (5th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2018).
139
140
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The new Florida provisions also set specific deadlines for the
scheduling of a trial. Specifically, the provisions call for a trial judge to hold
a calendar call within fifteen days of a state attorney’s filing of a demand for
a speedy trial.148 The provisions then require that the judge schedule a trial
within sixty days of the conference, unless the court enters an order “with
specific findings of fact” that justify a later trial date.149
In addition to creating time requirements that ensure that victims do not
have to suffer unreasonable delays in scheduling trials, the Florida
Amendment also creates timeliness requirements for concluding any statelevel appeal and collateral attack on a criminal judgment. Specifically, the
amendment requires that any such attacks “must be complete within two
years from the date of appeal in non-capital cases and within five years from
the date of appeal in capital cases.”150
Like trial court timelines, exceptions to these deadlines exist if a court
“enters an order with specific findings as to why the court was unable to
comply . . . and the circumstances causing delay.”151 In addition, the
Amendment requires that on a yearly basis “the chief judge of any district
court of appeal or the chief justice of the supreme court shall report on a caseby-case basis to the speaker of the house of representatives and the president
of the senate all cases where the court entered” such an order “regarding
inability to comply” with the appellate level deadline.152
These provisions raise no separation of powers questions. While the
Amendment sets out standard timelines for criminal cases—implicitly giving
priority to their resolution—a Florida court remains free to depart from the
timelines in a particular case if there is a good, case-specific reason requiring
a departure. If there is such a reason, the court must explain its specific
reasons for departing. This is consistent with long-standing provisions in the
federal Speedy Trial Act, which also permit departure from a trial timeline
(70 days) if the court sets forth “in the record of the case, either orally or in
writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting
of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial.”153

148
149
150
151
152
153

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(10)(a).
Id.
Id. at § 16(b)(10)(b).
Id.
Id. at § .§ 16(b)(10)(b).
18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(7)(A) (2008).
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E. THE RIGHT TO REASONABLE PROTECTION AND OTHER
SAFETY-RELATED PROVISIONS

In addition to providing victims with rights that relate to proceedings,
the Amendment also extends certain protections designed to keep victims
safe throughout the entire criminal justice process. One overarching right is
the right to be “reasonably protected from the accused and any person acting
on behalf of the accused.”154 More than a dozen other states extend to victims
a similar constitutional right to be reasonably protected from the accused.155
For example, a California constitutional provision extends a right to victims
to “be reasonably protected from the defendant and persons acting on behalf
of the defendant.”156 Federal law, too, gives victims “[t]he right to be
reasonably protected from the accused.”157
These kinds of provisions are designed to require that a crime victim’s
safety be considered by courts, parole boards, and other government actors
in making discretionary decisions that could lead to harm to a crime victim.158
An illustration of this is the provision of a separate waiting area in a
courthouse, where a victim might be kept separate from the defendant or the
defendant’s family.159
In extending a right to reasonable protection, the Amendment clarifies
that the new right is not “intended to create a special relationship between the
crime victim and any law enforcement agency or office.”160 The CRC’s
drafting history underlying this clause reveals that the drafters’ intention was

154

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(3).
See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29(3). See generally BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at
257–58.
156 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(2).
157
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (2006). See generally Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an
Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to
be Reasonably Protected from the Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 69–73 (2010) (critiquing
this provision).
158
In the case of a mandatory release of an offender (e.g., releasing a defendant who has
served the statutory maximum term of imprisonment), no such discretionary consideration
needs to be made regarding a victim’s safety, although a victim will receive notice of the
release.
159
Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n Meeting, Mar. 20, 2018 Session, vol. II at
259–60 (Mar. 20, 2018), http://flcrc.gov/Meetings/Transcripts.html [https://perma.cc/44DGV7CB]. This illustration was offered as part of the provisions’ drafting history. Id.
160
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(3).
155
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to ensure that the provision was not interpreted as requiring “around-theclock protection when . . . it is not warranted for victims.”161
The Florida Amendment contains an additional provision promising
victims the “right to have the safety and welfare of the victim and the victim’s
family considered when setting bail, including setting pretrial release
conditions that protect the safety and welfare of the victim and the victim’s
family.”162 Defendants and convicted offenders who are released may pose
a danger to their victims. These dangers can be particularly pronounced for
victims of domestic and sexual violence. For instance, in November 2017
Jason McGuire chased his estranged wife Madonna with a hammer in Cape
Coral, Florida.163 Fearful for her safety, she filed of aggravated battery
charges against her husband. McGuire was released on December 2, and one
week later he killed Madonna.164
Sadly, Madonna’s case is hardly unique.165 In an effort to prevent such
travesties, Florida has now joined a number of other states in enacting
constitutional provisions requiring notice to crime victims whenever an
offender will no longer in custody.166 During criminal proceedings, before a
sentence is imposed, the new Florida Amendment promises victims the right
to “reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any release or escape of the
defendant or delinquent . . . .”167 After a sentence is imposed, the
Amendment promises victims a right to notice of “any scheduled release date
of the offender, and the release of or the escape of the offender from

161
Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n Meeting, Mar. 20, 2018 Session, vol. II at
259–60 (March 20, 2018), http://flcrc.gov/Meetings/Transcripts.html [https://perma.cc/44DG
-V7CB].
162
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(4).
163
Adam Pinsker, Murder Victim Had Restraining Order Against Husband, FOX 4 NEWS,
Dec. 18, 2017, https://www.fox4now.com/news/local-news/murder-victim-had-restrainingorder-against-husband [https://perma.cc/BJ59-J7QH].
164
Id.
165
Jeffrey A. Cross, The Repeated Sufferings of Domestic Violence Victims Not Notified
of Their Assailant’s Pre-Trial Release from Custody: A Call for Mandatory Domestic Violence
Victim Notification Legislation, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 915, 915–16 (1996).
166
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(12); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(1).
167
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(a). While Florida did not have a previous constitutional
provision regarding these rights, statutory protections did exist regarding notice of release.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001(1)(e) (West 2019) (requiring notice to victims of “[t]he
release of the accused pending judicial proceedings” and “when a term of imprisonment,
detention, or residential commitment is imposed, the release of the defendant or juvenile
offender from such imprisonment, detention, or residential commitment”); id. § 960.001(1)(p)
(requiring notice to victims of any escape from a state facility).
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custody.”168 These provisions track provisions in, for example, the California
Victims’ Rights Amendment, which gives victims the right to request to be
informed of “the scheduled release date of the defendant, and the release of
or the escape by the defendant from custody.”169 Other states have
comparable notice requirements.170 These provisions ensure that victims are
not surprised to discover that an offender is no longer in custody.
The Florida Amendment requires notice to be provided in either of two
circumstances: either a release, which could include a post-arrest release, the
post-conviction paroling of a defendant, or a pardon,171 or an escape. The
administrative burdens associated with such notification requirements have
been minimized by technological advances. As with many other states,
Florida already has in place a computer-operated program that can place a
telephone call to a programmed number when a prisoner is moved from one
prison to another or released.172
The new Florida Amendment also provides a victim a right to protection
from more than just the threat of physical violence. For many of the same
reasons that victims may become targets of violence because of their
participation in the criminal justice system, they are also often the targets of
harassment and verbal abuse. Taking these additional forms of potential
harm into account, the Amendment guarantees a victim the “right to be free
from intimidation, harassment, and abuse.”173 Here again, other states have
similar provisions.174
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FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(f).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(12).
170
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (Victim’s right to “be informed, upon request,
when the accused or convicted person is released from custody or has escaped.”); MICH.
CONST. art I, § 24(1) (Crime victims have the right “to information about the conviction,
sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(2)
(“[V]ictims of a crime have the right to . . . be reasonably informed when the accused or
convicted person is arrested, released from custody, or has escaped . . . .”).
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See generally Mary Margaret Giannini, Measured Mercy: Managing the Intersection
of Executive Pardon Power and Victims’ Rights with Procedural Justice Principles, 13 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 89 (2015).
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See Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Victim Services, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/vict/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9XDY-MET3].
173
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(2).
174
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(1) (Victims have a right to “be treated with
fairness and respect for his or her privacy and dignity, and to be free from intimidation,
harassment, and abuse, throughout the criminal or juvenile justice process.”); ILL. CONST. art.
1, § 8.1(a)(1) (Crime victims have the right to “right to be treated with fairness and respect for
their dignity and privacy and to be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse throughout
the criminal justice process.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(b) (Victims shall be entitled to the
169
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F.

THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND DIGNITY

Frequently victims have substantial privacy and dignity interests at
stake in criminal proceedings.175 Sexual-assault victims, for example, suffer
the ultimate invasion of privacy and run the risk of continued loss of privacy
during the resulting criminal justice process.176 A criminal justice system
should be structured so that it avoids unnecessary invasions of privacy and
insults to a victim’s dignity.177
Recognizing the legitimacy of protecting such victims’ interests, a
number of states extend specific protections to crime victims’ privacy and
dignity interests. For example, California promises a victim a right “[t]o be
treated with fairness and respect for his or her privacy and dignity.” 178
Arizona promises crime victims the right “[t]o be treated with fairness,
respect, and dignity . . . throughout the criminal justice process.”179 Indiana
extends to victims “the right to be treated with fairness, dignity and respect
throughout the criminal justice process.”180 Federal law, too, guarantees
crime victims “[t]he right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim’s dignity and privacy.”181
The Florida Amendment takes a slightly different approach to
protecting the privacy rights of victims. Rather than enumerating any general
right to privacy as some states do, the Amendment provides that victims have
rights to “fairness,” “respect for the victim’s dignity,” and “to prevent the
disclosure of information or records that could be used to locate or harass the
victim or the victim’s family, or which could disclose confidential or
privileged information of the victim.”182 The precise scope of these rights
remains to be fully defined,183 but existing principles and caselaw provide
general guidance.
“right to be free from intimidation, harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice
system.”).
175
See generally Mary Graw Leary, The Third Dimension of Victimization, 13 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 139 (2015) (discussing digital victimization).
176
See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims’ Identities,
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1020–21 (1991).
177
Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power of Dignity: Dignity’s Evolution in
the Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 43, 44–45 (2016).
178
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(1).
179
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.
180
IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b).
181
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (2018).
182
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(5).
183
Presumably shared societal understanding of expected privacy interests will be central
to this development. Cf. Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111
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With respect to a right to “fairness,” such provisions are usually
understood as being analogous to a defendant’s right to due process.184 For
example, Senator Kyl explained with regard to the federal CVRA’s fairness
provision that “[o]f course, fairness includes the notion of due process.” 185
In Florida, interestingly, victims are promised both a right to “fairness” as
well as a right to “due process,”186 implying that fairness must be broadly
construed to extend beyond due process.
A right to “dignity” has also been applied in other crime victims’ cases
and can be applied in Florida in a case-by-case approach. To take one
example, a federal district court in Kansas considered whether to admit into
the courtroom cameras and sketch artists, who might have depicted
likenesses of mentally-ill crime victims.187 In restricting such depictions
under the federal CVRA’s right to be treated with “dignity,” the court
explained that “there is a compelling government interest in protecting the
dignity, as well as the physical and psychological well-being, of mentally-ill
alleged crime victims who have been potentially exploited through extensive
video recording of themselves engaged in bizarre sexual behavior under the
tutelage of their social worker.”188 Florida’s new dignity provision invites
courts to make similar case-specific applications of the right when a victim’s
dignity is unnecessarily threatened.
With regard to Florida’s provision restricting disclosure of information
that could be used to harass the victim, Florida’s police agencies have already
begun implementing these provisions. Because of the new Florida
Amendment, police agencies are no longer making automatic disclosures of
sensitive information about victims.189 And with regard to restrictions on
releasing information that is confidential or privileged, the new Amendment
may increase the effectiveness of protections for certain materials. For
example, Florida and other states have enacted sexual assault-counseling
NW. U. L. REV. 141, 149–63 (2016) (discussing expectation of privacy in Fourth Amendment
case law).
184
See Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 13, at 1387 (discussing right to “fairness”
under Utah’s victims’ rights amendment).
185
150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
186
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1).
187
United States v. Kaufman, No. CRIM.A. 04-40141-01, 2005 WL 2648070 (D. Kan.
Oct. 17, 2005).
188
Id. at *4.
189
See Paul Cassell & Meg Garvin, Marsy’s Law is Working as Intended, Protecting
Victims’ and the Public Interest, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 30, 2019,
https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/marsys-law-is-working-as-intended-protectingvictims-and-the-public-interest-20190130/ [https://perma.cc/WM7J-UCA9].
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privilege laws, which enable sexual assault counselors to maintain the
confidentiality of information revealed to them by crime victims.190
Constitutional protection for victims’ privacy may help to ensure that such
statutes operate as intended.191
G. THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION

Finally, the Florida Amendment provides a right to restitution. All
states have recognized, at least to some degree, a crime victim’s right to
restitution through statute,192 and about twenty states have added a state
constitutional right to restitution.193 For example, Illinois promises to a crime
victim “[t]he right to restitution” in its constitution.194 North Carolina
extends to a crime victim “[t]he right [as prescribed by law] to receive
restitution.”195 The California Constitution provides that “[r]estitution shall
be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the
sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.” 196
Congress has also enacted broad restitution provisions in the federal
system.197
The new Florida Amendment gives victims a sweeping constitutional
right to “full and timely restitution in every case and from each convicted
190

See FLA. STAT. § 90.5035 (2002); see also 735 ILL. COMPILED STAT. ANN. 5/8-802.1
(2013) (protecting confidentiality of statements made to rape crisis personnel). See generally
BONNIE J. CAMPBELL, Preface to U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SEXUAL ASSAULT OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS AND THEIR COUNSELORS: FINDINGS AND MODEL LEGISLATION (1995) (describing state
sexual assault-counseling privilege laws).
191
See People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639, 643 (Colo. 2005) (noting justifications for victimcounselor privilege); Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 907 (discussing victims’
privacy interests).
192
See PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 171 (3d ed.
2016). Florida did not previously afford a constitutional right to restitution, but it did have a
statutory provision. See FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(a) (2015) (“In addition to any punishment,
the court shall order the defendant to make restitution to the victim for: 1. Damage or loss
caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense; and 2. Damage or loss related to the
defendant’s criminal episode, unless it finds clear and compelling reasons not to order such
restitution.”).
193
See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 192, at 171.
194
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(10). For discussion of the Illinois provision, see Jeffrey A.
Parness, The New Illinois Constitutional Crime Victim Restitution Right: A Revolutionary
Amendment?, 27 DCBA BR. 26 (2015).
195
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37(1)(c).
196
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13)(B).
197
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2018).
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offender for all losses suffered, both directly and indirectly, by the victim as
a result of the criminal conduct.”198 The drafting history of the provision
makes clear that the intention was “to be certain that victims who have
suffered an economic loss are made whole.”199 Against that backdrop, the
far-reaching language in the provision promising restitution in “every case”
makes clear that victims are always entitled to financial recovery from their
offenders for any financial loss resulting from the crime. Similarly, the broad
language guaranteeing “full” restitution for “all losses suffered, both directly
and indirectly” makes clear that victims are entitled to restitution for all
aspects of any loss. For example, not only are victims entitled to recover the
fair market value of any property they may have lost, but if incremental value
existed—such as sentimental value—then restitution is required for that
value as well.200 Finally, the inclusion of a timeliness requirement provides
an opportunity for victims to demand restitution as soon as it becomes
reasonably available.
The Florida Amendment’s language also is clearer than some other
restitution laws on how restitution is to be paid in situations where a victim
suffers a loss caused by multiple criminals. The right to restitution “from
each convicted offender for all losses suffered” means that a victim need not
apportion her restitution among multiple defendants.201 Some other
restitution regimes have had difficulty providing full restitution to victims in
these situations, such as child-pornography possession crimes, when many
widely distributed offenders are together responsible for the victim’s
losses.202 The Florida Amendment, however, takes the simple step of clearly
making any convicted defendant jointly and severally liable for all of a
victim’s losses—a standard approach in tort law that applies equally well to
criminal restitution awards.203
198

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(9).
See Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n, Mar. 20, 2018 Session, vol. II at 260–
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Even though this restitution provision is broad, offenders may often lack
the means to make full restitution. Accordingly, even in the face of a full
restitution requirement, a sentencing judge can establish an appropriate
repayment schedule and enforce it during the period in which the offender is
under the court’s jurisdiction.204 It is important to understand that victims’
interests and defendants’ interests can sometimes align on restitution. A
defendant who pays restitution may be able to raise a well-deserved claim for
mitigation of other penalties, perhaps gaining a shorter term of imprisonment
or perhaps even no imprisonment at all so that he can continue to work and
make restitution payments to victims.205 Notably, a defendant who cannot
pay the full amount of restitution ordered is put on a payment plan to pay
only as much as they can reasonably afford.206 As with many other issues,
the trial court can exercise its sound discretion in implementing restitution,
provided that the victim’s right to full restitution is protected.
H. THE “VICTIM” DEFINITION PROVISION

In addition to extending rights to crime victims, the new Florida
Amendment provides a definition of a “victim” to whom the rights are
extended.207 This definition is important, as otherwise victims’ rights would
be remitted to the discretion of either the courts or the legislature in deciding
who would be afforded rights.
The Amendment provides that “[a]s used in this section, a ‘victim’ is a
person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial
harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or
delinquent act or against whom the crime or delinquent act is committed.”208
This “victim” definition is a standard one, having been used elsewhere, such
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as California’s constitutional provisions.209 Its application in most cases
should be straightforward, since for many crimes Florida prosecutors must
identify a specific victim.210 In situations where “victim” status is in doubt,
the trial court can inquire into the circumstances of the case and see where a
person claiming victims status has suffered “direct or threatened physical,
psychological, or financial harm.”
In some cases, the victim will be unable to personally exercise their
rights. In such cases, the Florida Amendment provides that the “term
‘victim’ includes the victim’s lawful representative, the parent or guardian of
a minor, or the next of kin of a homicide victim, except upon a showing that
the interest of such individual would be in actual or potential conflict with
the interests of the victim.”211 Thus, in situations where the victim is a minor,
is incapacitated, or deceased (as in a homicide case), the victim’s
“representative” can step into the victim’s shoes to assert the victim’s rights.
The Amendment makes clear that “[t]he term ‘victim’ does not include
the accused.”212 This provision ensures that someone who is criminally
culpable cannot attempt to take advantage of victims’ enactments, as has
occasionally been attempted in other states.213 Also, to ensure that crime
victims who are harmed by juveniles are covered by the Amendment’s
provisions, the Amendment specifies that its protections extend not just to
crimes by adults but also “delinquent acts and conduct.” 214
I.

IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

In addition to extending the substantive rights discussed above, the
Amendment also contains various enforcement provisions designed to
guarantee that the rights will work effectively. In addition to enumerating
rights, Florida’s Amendment clarifies that the rights included “may not be
construed to deny or impair any other rights possessed by victims.” 215
Further, that provision also declares that the Amendment is self-executing
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and does not “require implementing legislation.”216 This provision gives the
Amendment’s new rights automatic legal effect without the need for any
subsequent action by the Florida Legislature. Of course, the fact that
accompanying legislation is not required does not mean it is not permitted.
Legislation has been proposed in Florida to aid in the implementation of the
victims’ rights enumerated in the new constitutional language—although
such legislation has yet to be enacted.217
The Amendment also guarantees that victims will receive information
about their rights. The Amendment extends to victims the “right to be
informed of these rights . . . . This information shall be made available to the
general public and provided to all crime victims in the form of a card or by
other means intended to effectively advise the victim of their rights under
this section.”218 This provision already exists in many other states that have
adopted Marsy’s Laws, including California.219 Presumably, the information
will be provided through a Marsy’s Law card, which law enforcement
officers can provide to victims when they contact them after the crime.220
Once victims receive information about their rights under the
Amendment, the Amendment also ensures that they are empowered to assert
and seek enforcement of their rights. Responding to enforcement problems
with earlier victims’ protections,221 the new Amendment specifically
authorizes victims, attorneys retained by victims, lawful representatives of
victims, and prosecutors acting upon the request of victims to “assert and
seek enforcement of the rights enumerated in th[e] section . . . as a matter of
right.”222 This provision guarantees victims—and those representing a
victim’s interests—“standing”223 to assert victims’ rights in any case where
those rights are implicated.
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The Amendment further requires that courts and other authorities with
jurisdiction over a case to enforce the rights of victims whenever victims
assert them. Specifically, the Amendment requires that authorities “shall act
promptly on such a request [for enforcement of a victim’s right], affording a
remedy by due course of law . . . .”224 Further, the Amendment requires
victims receive an adequate explanation for the authority’s decision by
mandating the authority “clearly stat[e] on the record” the reasons for its
disposition of the victim’s asserted right.225 These provisions, similar to
those found in other victims’ enactments,226 should provide victims the
power to directly and quickly secure enforcement of their rights in the
circumstances where government authorities fail to provide them.227
III. LESSONS FROM FLORIDA’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR
VICTIMS
Having reviewed how Florida’s new constitutional provisions were
designed to operate, can we learn any broader lessons about protecting crime
victims’ rights in state constitutions and, more broadly, about state
constitutions in general? Four lessons seem particularly important.
A first lesson to be drawn from the new Florida amendment is that a
consensus is emerging regarding the kind of rights to which crime victims
are entitled. Marsy’s Law supporters were proud to report after the
November 2018 election that an additional 52 million Americans were
covered by Marsy’s Law provisions228—and that figure did not account for
the population of other states, including California, which had previously
approved strong state constitutional victims’ rights amendments.
Very little language in the Florida Amendment is unprecedented or
untested.229 To the contrary, almost all the provisions parallel other state
constitutional provisions (or the federal CVRA). This conjunction of
language may provide support for Professor Paul Kahn’s suggestion that the
224
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interpretation of state constitutions ultimately reflects common principles
leading to an “American constitutionalism.”230 While the extent of such state
constitutional convergence has been disputed,231 the developing convergence
on crime victims’ rights should reassure legislators, courts, and others
involved in the criminal justice system that victims’ rights can be
successfully grafted on to existing processes. And, more broadly, perhaps
the emerging consensus and convergence of these victims’ rights enactments
will demarcate a set of widely shared values around the country.232
The second lesson that emerges is that extensive rights can be crafted to
provide rights to victims that do not undercut other interests. Comparing
Florida’s original 1988 victims’ rights amendment to the 2018 version
reveals a dramatic difference. In 1988, Florida moved quite cautiously,
promising crime victims just three rights—the rights to be informed, present,
and heard (when relevant)—at “crucial” proceedings.233
The country now knows much more about the kinds of victims’ rights
that need to be protected—and can be protected—than it did several decades
ago. Florida’s new Amendment promises victims a lengthy set of rights,
including both specific and general rights. The new Amendment attempts to
cover the full extent of potential issues confronting crime victims during the
criminal justice process, addressing everything from victims’ rights during
initial bail hearings, plea discussions and plea hearing, to trials, sentencings,
and parole and commutation proceedings. The new Amendment addresses
all aspects of the criminal process.
Victims are becoming part of the day-to-day landscape of criminal
cases. Too often in the past, crime victims were viewed as the “barbarians at
the gate”234—an unworthy group seeking to destroy the criminal justice
system rather than improve it. But the idea that crime victims’ rights should
not be a part of a conventional criminal justice system is becoming
increasingly difficult to maintain, as Florida and many other states enact
expansive victims’ rights amendments responsive to community needs.
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Florida’s experience in expanding constitutional protections for victims
may set an example for other states. About a dozen states lack any state
constitutional protections for crime victims.235 Florida’s decision to enlarge
previously existing victims’ rights might signal to these states the importance
of adding state constitutional rights for victims.
For the more than two-thirds of states that have already enacted victims’
rights amendments, Florida’s recent amendment might also serve as a
model—particularly for those states with antiquated provisions. Just as
Florida’s amendment required updating, other states might consider whether
their amendments need modernization. For any state lacking comprehensive
constitutional protection of victims’ interests, Florida’s new progressive
provisions can provide guidance.
A third lesson evident from the new Florida Amendment is the
importance of providing “standing” and other enforcement mechanisms in
crime victims protections. In 1988, Florida adopted a few baseline rights for
crime victims.236 But as noted earlier,237 an inability to enforce those basic
provisions led to an incomplete implementation of the rights. If states are
going to promise crime victims rights in the criminal justice process, victims
need “standing” to assert their rights, as otherwise the victims’ rights are
rendered meaningless.
Using language found in constitutional amendments in other states,
Florida now provides victims standing through a specific constitutional right
to assert their rights,238 ensuring that courts and other institutions cannot
simply ignore victims’ interests. Perhaps even more important, the Florida
Amendment also requires that the courts “shall act promptly on such a
request, affording a remedy by due course of law for the violation of any
right.”239 These specific enforcement measures should make victims’ rights
in Florida not just a set of paper promises, but realities in the criminal justice
system.
Clear and simple directions to enforce crime victims’ rights are
especially necessary because of the unfortunate reality that victims often
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need to assert their rights without the assistance of legal counsel.240 The
procedural mechanisms for enforcing victims’ rights should be laid out as
clearly and simply as possible so that even victims without legal counsel
know how to proceed.
By providing specific enforcement mechanisms, Florida’s Amendment
fits within a broader pattern of recent “self-executing” state constitutional
amendments. Self-executing constitutional provisions are those that take full
effect without the need for any further legislative action.241 As discussed
above,242 the new Florida Amendment directly provides that its provisions
“are self-executing, and do not require implementing legislation.”243
Florida’s specific language may signal that crime victims’ rights protections
are, like some other recently enacted state constitutional protections, “a
modern fundamental right deserving of constitutional stature and insulation
from the whims of courts and the legislature.”244
Fourth and finally, Florida crime victims now have broad and
overarching rights to “due process,” “fairness,” and “respect for the victim’s
dignity.”245 These capacious rights should significantly advance the attention
that courts and other institutions pay to victims’ interests in the criminal
justice process. Just as the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s used
“due process” language in the Fourteenth Amendment to significantly
expand criminal defendants’ rights,246 it is possible that Florida (and other
240
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states) courts will use similarly broad language in crime victims’
amendments to ensure that crime victims’ concerns are not overlooked.
Many commentators have urged state courts to begin paying renewed
attention to state constitutional provisions, including exploring the full reach
of state due process clauses and other similarly broadly worded rights. For
example, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton recently published
an excellent book, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of
American Constitutional Law, explaining how state constitutions are
designed to be “change incubators,” developing new ways to protect
individual rights in an increasingly complex world.247 By interpreting their
state constitutional provisions, state courts can develop innovative rights,
perhaps ultimately exporting ideas that work in one state to other states and
federal government.248 Judge Sutton is hardly alone in calling attention to
the role of state constitutions in protecting important rights in this country.
At least since Justice William J. Brennan’s influential 1986 article on how
state constitutions can serve as guardians of individual rights,249 many state
courts and legal commentators have echoed this position.250 The protections
for crime victims now found in Florida and other states’ constitutions provide
the perfect opportunity for such development.
As Florida and other states move on to the next chapter in their efforts
to protect crime victims’ rights, this incubation of rights may result in further
attention to how best to protect crime victims in the criminal justice process.
Florida’s experience with its clear and comprehensive victims’ rights
Amendment may well inform a national conversation recognizing crime
victims’ rights as worthy of protection in our nation’s fundamental charter—
247
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perhaps leading to a federal constitutional amendment providing the highest
level of constitutional protection for all crime victims across the country.

